The Three Escalations - Part III
Russia's decision to annex the occupied territories of Ukraine represents a serious escalation, any fighting in these territories will now be considered fighting in Russia-proper by Moscow
Hours after the Nordstream explosions took over international news, Russia announced the vote tallies from illegal forced votes in occupied Ukrainian territory. It is important to note here that that sentence is not biased but the truth. Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 and then invaded again this year. Donestk, Luhansk, Crimea and other territories seized this year were taken in a blatant war of conquest which is illegal under international law. The referenda to join Russia are sham elections conducted at gunpoint on an occupied population. The falsified results ranged from 86% in favor of annexation in contested regions like Kherson to 98% in the eastern regions that have been occupied since 2014. Barring the Crimean referendum that took place in 2014, the last major exchange of territory in Europe occurred after World War II when significant portions of Germany and Italy were apportioned to allied countries. The last annexations in Europe from a war of pure conquest came from the Nazi invasions1 .
What is the goal of these sham referenda and attaching these territories to Russia when Russian troops can barely hold on to them as is?
As mentioned in Parts I and II, the annexations combine with mobilization and the possibility that Russia conducted the attack on Nordstream to act as a message to NATO, i.e. stop supporting Ukraine or you risk general war. By making parts of Ukraine the formal territory of Russia it also brings the nuclear threat into play. Any direct NATO support of Ukraine runs the risk that NATO troops, or even weapons, touching Luhansk or Kherson risks a significant, possibly nuclear, escalation. Putin must know by now that the strongest card he has left in his deck is also his most dangerous. Yet he must threaten to play it and have reasonable belief he may play it since his other cards have failed.
Here is the catch, a catch Putin may not be considering or care to consider, how does this war end?
The formal annexations are not going to stop Ukraine who appears to be winning at the moment. The international community cannot allow them to stand because it establishes precedent that nuclear-equipped nations can annex territory at will. Of course NATO cannot go to war with Russia because of the threat of a general war and its almost certain spiraling into a nuclear exchange (a conventional war with Russia essentially being a minimal military threat at this point). So to defeat this precedent, Ukraine must win. How can Ukraine win if victory entails reconquest and recognition of all former Ukranian territories potentially including Crimea. This would be the end of Putin as he cannot maintain his position having started and subsequently lost the war, especially when the pre-2022 status quo included Russian control of Crimea. This reality is why Putin is pushing the nuclear envelope, he does not care how this ends for the rest of us if it means he is going down regardless.
This also opens a new possibility that Ukraine may have to confront. It is at war with Russia. And if conflict now entails fighting on what Russia considers to be Russian soil then what is stopping Ukraine from an attack on the crucial road-rail junction at Belgorod? Or sending a force towards Bryansk or Kursk? These would be military targets, legally no different from what Ukraine is pursuing in Kherson or towards Severodonestk, after all? And to end the war either Ukraine will have to cede some territory (a non-starter for Kyiv) or Russia will now have to cede some territory (a non-starter for Moscow with nuclear risks). This impasse could protract the war until the political situation opens some kind of compromise, a government changes (hard to see in either case), or the global situation changes dramatically.
This is why this week’s escalations all go hand-in-hand. Mobilization buys the time Moscow needs to protract the war. The sabotage of NordStream (assuming Russia was the culprit) sends a chilling message to NATO that European infrastructure would be a target. The misinformation surrounding the sabotage gives the dangerous Russian propaganda apparatus the fodder it needs to sow doubt amongst allies. Indeed, even Belarus (relatively quiet since the opening of the war) looks poised to pursue mobilizations, likely a threat designed to keep Kyiv wondering if its western supply lines could be threatened.
One of the ways Putin can win this war without going nuclear is achieving pressure on Europe that the western political situation changes and western pressure on Kyiv halts the war or the weapons shipments Ukraine needs to continue its run of success. This is not outlandish. Europe is deep in a monetary and energy crisis. Today, Viktor Orban of Hungary declared that Hungary will not support further sanctions on Russia that would impact energy flows to Hungarians. Italy has a new right-wing governing party. The UK could announce an election at any moment. U.S. midterms are coming in November. A global economic crisis combined with inflation (especially on food and energy) and friendly parties in various key positions could undermine NATO unity.
Make no mistake, the annexations cloud the war and open a new dangerous phase of the conflict. Combined with the escalations this week it could be among Putin’s last best chances to stabilize his power situation and put real pressure on Kyiv, Brussels and Washington. So far, that pressure does not appear to be working. For a war that is a little over half a year old and with so much at stake, one should settle in for a long winter and prepare for further, more dangerous escalations.
Here is the link to Part I on the NordStream sabotage and Part II on the Russian mobilization.
Turkey’s invasion of Northern Cyprus has never been formalized as an annexation and this article is not taking into account the fighting and territorial changes in the Caucuses.