Can Putin Win?

If Russia Invades, or Even Persists in its Threats Against Ukraine, Can is Even "Win"?

With the situation in Ukraine spiraling the question arises, how can Russian President Vladimir Putin "win"? Indeed, what would a victory look like in this situation?

We should begin by noting a few obvious points. Firstly, this entire situation has made Russia and Putin pariahs on the international stage. Every country seems to stand with Ukraine and outside of Belarus, Syria, and Cuba, even Russia's usual backers are quiet on the issue. Notably, China's statements seem to back state sovereignty, a potentially significant split between Beijing and Moscow.

Secondly, some form of sanctions package seems assured at this point. Interestingly, Putin seems to acknowledge that they will be hit with something while also not seeming to care too much what the something is. With statements from European leaders and the White House seeming to preclude removing Russia from the global SWIFT banking system as well as not levying sanctions on Russia's energy sector, he may be correct in his lack of concern.

Thirdly, social media pundits have been vocal in their belief that a Russian invasion would be the beginning of the end for Putin. Concerns about public relations, Russia's ability to finance operations, and a reliance on a transparent playbook that calls into question operations as far back as the 1999 apartment bombings that led to intervention in Chechnya are all floating about as reasons that could undermine Putin's hold on power.

Lastly there is also the sheer uncertainty of war. There is little doubt that an intervention would result in quick air superiority for Russia but what about ground control? Does Russia have the strength and determination to occupy the Donbas? Siege, take and hold Kharkiv and/or Kyiv? Push all the way to Lviv and the border of NATO and the EU? Can Putin's impressive propaganda arm paint over thousands or tens of thousands of Russian casualties? This speaks nothing of the wild card in any war in Europe, spillover into a general war with NATO. Russia has something like 60 percent of its military centered around Ukraine. A significant portion of Belarusian forces are involved as well. If the conflict spilled over there is little left to quickly and effectively pivot to defend Kaliningrad, northern Belarus, or even St. Petersburg. Remember what Churchill said, "Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter." This wouldn't be Georgia or a limited invasion like Crimea in 2014, Putin won't enjoy full control here.

So why are we even here? With so much doubt around the situation why would Putin even risk this unless there is a path he sees as a victory.

Foreign policy in Russia is actually fairly simple. Putin's inner circle of oligarchs and ex-KGB allies have power and they don't have to share much. Putin laments the collapse of the Soviet Union. And all believe the west and the U.S. is in decline with American/NATO foreign policy lashing out wildly as a result (hence the belief that the 2014 Euromaidan revolution was a western coup). As the oligarchy at the top has consolidated its power over time, the line between Putin and Russia has blurred.

As a result, Putin wants to keep the west off balance. Wagner Group mercenaries in Africa, aid to Cuba and Venezuela, large scale Russian intervention in Syria all of these moves align with the goal of keeping Washington guessing. Indeed, the pendulum shifting presidencies have struggled to define America's relation with Putin, much less effectively counter Moscow's goals.

Nowhere is this more dramatic than the ex-Soviet states, the historic "sphere of influence" of Russia.

Outside of the Baltics which were quick to join NATO, Russia has kept its immediate backyard free of the "weeds" of western values. Belarus is firmly in check. Kazakhstan too. Invasions of Ukraine and Georgia have kept these neighbors off kilter as well. All of these are direct shots across the bow of Washington, the alleged global policeman. Instead of political movements that might spill over into Russia ushering in a wave of anti-corruption and pro-openness policies, Putin has his buffer and has the west off balance.

So much of this makes sense if you consider that a core Putin goal is preventing a "color revolution" in Russia. Keeping Ukraine divided and in check prevents a western "foothold" on the doorstep of the Volga. Indeed with many ethnic Russians in Ukraine, fostering any Russian-Ukranian conflict theoretically prevents a pro-democracy movement from taking hold within a nearby ethnic Russian population. Though it should be noted that many Russian speaking Ukrainians do not support Putin.

It should also be noted that much of this could be a feint to consolidate these "Russian" breakaway states. For two weeks highly publicized military build ups have pundits speculating about military actions in the streets of Kyiv and Kharkiv. The Biden Administration has even circulated an alleged "kill list" of dissidents and pro-democracy supporters in Ukraine that Russian forces would pursue. Fear of the worst case scenario is rampant. Yet at today's meeting of the Russian Security Council the conversation revolved around recognizing the breakaway Republics with the idea of military intervention and annexation in these regions floated out. If Putin's modus operandi of keeping the west off balance is too believed, it would make sense to threaten a catastrophic war of conquest to get the west to "settle" for the occupation and annexation of the already broken away republics. This would consolidate Russia's hold on these "Russian" territories and indeed tens of thousands of civilians from these areas have already been forcibly removed into Russia. Putin could absolutely win in this way and probably even avoid the worst of sanctions and other foreign policy repercussions simply because he didn't pursue the worst case scenario of catastrophic, highly visible, urban warfare in 2022.

This all aligns with how decision making occurs in Moscow. Alexander Gabuev, senior fellow and chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Programme at the Carnegie Moscow Centre, recently wrote in The Economist:

"What actually drives the Kremlin are the tough ideas and interests of a small group of longtime lieutenants to President Vladimir Putin, as well as those of the Russian leader himself. Emboldened by perceptions of the West’s terminal decline, no one in this group loses much sleep about the prospect of an open-ended confrontation with America and Europe."

Indeed, the benefits of intervention outweigh the consequences. In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine and directly annexed Crimea. In a way that is a stunning sentence because it reads like something out of a 19th century wargame. Yet it's reality and that was only eight years ago.

The consequences for Russia have been essentially non-existant. Trade continues, Russia's participation in international relations and events has been unimpeded, financial impacts on the ruling oligarchs can't get much worse from 2014 (not that its impacted them much), and Europe is as addicted to Russian energy as ever.

The benefits far outweigh the minimal consequences. Russia gained territory including direct control over the valuable naval port at Sevastopol. With a window of the Black Sea, Russia is in a better situation to govern the development of energy infrastructure that might bypass Russia and Belarus, something that is obviously a strategic asset to Moscow. Indeed, any sanctions that do target "sectors" of the Russian economy would only benefit the oligarchs at the top of the Russian autakry. According to Gaubev import substitutions have only generated large budgets and funding to sectors controlled by Putin's entourage. For instance, a ban on food imports from countries that sanctioned Russia after 2014 led to domestic growth in Russian agribusiness. Coincidentally, Putin's agriculture minister is the eldest son of the head of Putin's Security Council. The added costs are borne by the average Russia but the added profits line the pockets of those in power.

This is a great time to point out that Ukraine is an agriculture power. This year Ukraine is estimated to account for 12 percent of global wheat exports, 16 percent of corn, and nearly 20 percent of rapeseed. A disruptive war would have repercussions on agricultural markets worldwide, increase commodity prices (which benefits those very oligarchs at the top of the Russian food chain), and put extreme pressure on western governments already dealing with inflation problems. If Russia did pursue an extreme course and annexed portions of Ukraine it would be adding this valuable farm land to its own territories. This same equation can be worked out for a host of resources and commodities, most of which have seen rising prices globally due to COVID-19. For example, at its lowest point in 2020 crude oil traded at $11.26/barrel. That has risen to roughly $90/barrel the last few days. Nearly $20 of that has come since the start of the year and a war in Europe wouldn't help decrease prices.

If traditional approaches to economic sanctions might actually benefit Putin and his entourage, then further intervention in Ukraine isn't just a possibility, it's practically incentivized. By creating a crisis he can emerge the victor in multiple ways. If he gets Kyiv to agree to his farfetched demands, he emerges as a diplomatic tactician. If he invades Ukraine, becomes a pariah, and subjects Russia to further sanctions he still gains territory and profits for his inner circle. A refugee crisis and crisis in Ukraine could further desirable Europe and expose deep divides in NATO which keeps his enemies off balance furthering broader foreign policy goals.

Indeed, exposing those divides is a way that Putin has already been winning. The flurry of diplomatic activity has demonstrated this. France and Germany seem keen to preserve the peace, even if it means perpetually negotiating with Putin on behalf of Ukraine. The U.S. and U.K. are willing to send supplies and express diplomatic support. The U.S. has also been more than willing to call out Putin's moves in an effort to steal the narrative and prevent false flags. Of course, Biden and Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi also took sanctioning the Russian energy sector off of the table days ago, effectively negotiating against themselves. The statements from eastern members like the Baltic states and Poland are far more aggressive ranging from sending weapons along with the U.S. and U.K. to publicly stating intelligence to pressing for preemptive sanctions before an invasion begins. NATO might be united as a defensive alliance with everyone saying all the right things, but the divides are there and they will get worse as Putin continues to press on the alliance.

Truly it seems the only way Putin can lose is if the game changes on him which only occurs with a more violent and larger war. This can only occur in two ways. The first is a strong showing by Ukraine on defense, a distinct possibility. The other is spillover that involes NATO.

And frankly if that happens, there may not be any winners.